1. Introduction

Consciousness poses the most baffling problems in the science of the mind. There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious experience, but there is nothing that is harder to explain. All sorts of mental phenomena have yielded to scientific investigation in recent years, but consciousness has stubbornly resisted. Many have tried to explain it, but the explanations always seem to fall short of the target. Some have been led to suppose that the problem is intractable and that no good explanation can be given.

To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this chapter I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness and argue that these methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the door to further progress is opened. In the second half of the chapter I argue that, if we move to a new kind of nonreductive explanation, a naturalistic account of consciousness can be given.

2. The Easy Problems and the Hard Problem

There is not just one problem of consciousness. “Consciousness” is an ambiguous term that refers to many different phenomena. Each of these phenomena
needs to be explained, but some are easier to explain than others. At the start, it is useful to divide the associated problems of consciousness into “hard” and “easy” problems. The easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. The hard problems are those that seem to resist those methods.

The easy problems of consciousness include those of explaining the following phenomena:

- the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli
- the integration of information by a cognitive system
- the reportability of mental states
- the ability of a system to access its own internal states
- the focus of attention
- the deliberate control of behavior
- the difference between wakefulness and sleep

All of these phenomena are associated with the notion of consciousness. For example, one sometimes says that a mental state is conscious when it is verbally reportable or when it is internally accessible. Sometimes a system is said to be conscious of some information when it has the ability to react on the basis of that information or, more strongly, when it attends to that information or when it can integrate that information and exploit it in the sophisticated control of behavior. We sometimes say that an action is conscious precisely when it is deliberate. Often we say that an organism is conscious as another way of saying that it is awake.

There is no real issue about whether these phenomena can be explained scientifically. All of them are straightforwardly vulnerable to explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. To explain access and reportability, for example, we need only specify the mechanism by which information about internal states is retrieved and made available for verbal report. To explain the integration of information, we need only exhibit mechanisms by which information is brought together and exploited by later processes. For an account of sleep and wakefulness, an appropriate neurophysiological account of the processes responsible for

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1. *This is an imperfect list, as most of the phenomena on the list have experiential aspects that raise the hard problem. There are distinctive sorts of experience involved in attention and voluntary control, for example. The list should be understood as calling attention to the functional rather than the experiential aspects of these phenomena. It should be noted that the easy problems are not characterized as the problems of intentionality.*
organisms’ contrasting behavior in those states will suffice. In each case, an appropriate cognitive or neurophysiological model can clearly do the explanatory work.

If these phenomena were all there was to consciousness, then consciousness would not be much of a problem. Although we do not yet have anything close to a complete explanation of these phenomena, we have a clear idea of how we might go about explaining them. This is why I call these problems the easy problems. Of course, “easy” is a relative term. Getting the details right will probably take a century or two of difficult empirical work. Still, there is every reason to believe that the methods of cognitive science and neuroscience will succeed.

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion; and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.

It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience, but the question of why it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.

If any problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one. In this central sense of “consciousness,” an organism is conscious if there is something it is like to be that organism, and a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that state. Sometimes terms such as “phenomenal consciousness” and “qualia” are also used here, but I find it more natural to speak of “conscious experience” or simply “experience.” Another useful way to avoid confusion (used by, e.g., Newell 1990; Chalmers 1996) is to reserve the term “consciousness” for the phenomena
of experience, using the less loaded term “awareness” for the more straightforward phenomena described earlier. If such a convention were widely adopted communication would be much easier; as things stand, those who talk about “consciousness” are frequently talking past each other.

The ambiguity of the term “consciousness” is often exploited by both philosophers and scientists writing on the subject. It is common to see a paper on consciousness begin with an invocation of the mystery of consciousness, noting the strange intangibility and ineffability of subjectivity and worrying that so far we have no theory of the phenomenon. Here, the topic is clearly the hard problem—the problem of experience. In the second half of the paper, the tone becomes more optimistic, and the author’s own theory of consciousness is outlined. Upon examination, this theory turns out to be a theory of one of the more straightforward phenomena—of reportability, of introspective access, or whatever. At the close, the author declares that consciousness has turned out to be tractable after all, but the reader is left feeling like the victim of a bait-and-switch. The hard problem remains untouched.

3. Functional Explanation

Why are the easy problems easy, and why is the hard problem hard? The easy problems are easy precisely because they concern the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions. To explain a cognitive function, we need only specify a mechanism that can perform the function. The methods of cognitive science are well suited for this sort of explanation and so are well suited to the easy problems of consciousness. By contrast, the hard problem is hard precisely because it is not a problem about the performance of functions. The problem persists even when the performance of all of the relevant functions is explained. (Here “function” is not used in the narrow teleological sense of something that a system is designed to do but in the broader sense of any causal role in the production of behavior that a system might perform.)

To explain reportability, for instance, is just to explain how a system could perform the function of producing reports on internal states. To explain internal access, we need to explain how a system could be appropriately affected by its internal states and use information about them in directing later processes. To explain integration and control, we need to explain how a system’s central processes can bring information together and use them in the facilitation of various behaviors. These are all problems about the explanation of functions.
How do we explain the performance of a function? By specifying a mechanism that performs the function. Here, neurophysiological and cognitive modeling are perfect for the task. If we want a detailed, low-level explanation, we can specify the neural mechanism that is responsible for the function. If we want a more abstract explanation, we can specify a mechanism in computational terms. Either way, a full and satisfying explanation will result. Once we have specified the neural or computational mechanism that performs the function of verbal report, for example, the bulk of our work in explaining reportability is over.

In a way, the point is trivial. It is a conceptual fact about these phenomena that their explanation involves only the explanation of various functions, as the phenomena are functionally definable. All it means for reportability to be instantiated in a system is that the system has the capacity for verbal reports of internal information. All it means for a system to be awake is for it to be appropriately receptive to information from the environment and for it to be able to use this information in directing behavior in an appropriate way. To see that this is a conceptual fact, note that someone who says, “You have explained the performance of the verbal report function, but you have not explained reportability,” is making a trivial conceptual mistake about reportability. All it could possibly take to explain reportability is an explanation of how the relevant function is performed; the same goes for the other phenomena in question.

Throughout the higher-level sciences, reductive explanation works in just this way. To explain the gene, for instance, we needed to specify the mechanism that stores and transmits hereditary information from one generation to the next. It turns out that DNA performs this function; once we explain how the function is performed, we have explained the gene. To explain life, we ultimately need to explain how a system can reproduce, adapt to its environment, metabolize, and so on. All of these are questions about the performance of functions and so are well suited to reductive explanation. The same holds for most problems in cognitive science. To explain learning, we need to explain the way in which a system’s behavioral capacities are modified in light of environmental information, and the way in which new information can be brought to bear in adapting a system’s actions to its environment. If we show how a neural or computational mechanism does the job, we have explained learning. We can say the same

2. *It is sometimes suggested that arguments for the explanatory gap turn on an outmoded “deductive-nomological” model of explanation. So it is worth noting that this chapter invokes a model of explanation in terms of functions and mechanisms. This model is closely related to models that have become popular in the philosophy of science in the years since the paper on which this chapter is based was published.*
for other cognitive phenomena, such as perception, memory, and language. Sometimes the relevant functions need to be characterized quite subtly, but it is clear that insofar as cognitive science explains these phenomena at all, it does so by explaining the performance of functions.

When it comes to conscious experience, this sort of explanation fails. What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report—a further unanswered question may remain: why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? A simple explanation of the functions leaves this question open.

There is no analogous further question in the explanation of genes or of life or of learning. If someone says, “I can see that you have explained how DNA stores and transmits hereditary information from one generation to the next, but you have not explained how it is a gene,” then they are making a conceptual mistake. All it means to be a gene is to be an entity that performs the relevant storage and transmission function. But if someone says, “I can see that you have explained how information is discriminated, integrated, and reported, but you have not explained how it is experienced,” they are not making a conceptual mistake. This is a nontrivial further question.

This further question is the key question in the problem of consciousness. Why doesn’t all of this information processing go on “in the dark,” free of any inner feel? Why is it that when electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, the discrimination and categorization are experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience does arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery. There is an explanatory gap (a term due to Levine 1983) between the functions and experience, and we need an explanatory bridge to cross it. A mere account of the functions stays on one side of the gap, so the materials for the bridge must be found elsewhere.

This is not to say that experience has no function. Perhaps it will turn out to play an important cognitive role, but for any role it might play, there will be more to the explanation of experience than a simple explanation of the function. Perhaps it will even turn out that in the course of explaining a function, we will be led to the key insight that allows an explanation of experience. If this happens, though, the discovery will be an extra explanatory reward. There is no cognitive function such that we can say in advance that explanation of that function will automatically explain experience.
To explain experience, we need a new approach. The usual explanatory methods of cognitive science and neuroscience do not suffice. These methods have been developed precisely to explain the performance of cognitive functions, and they do a good job of it. Still, as these methods stand, they are equipped to explain only the performance of functions. When it comes to the hard problem, the standard approach has nothing to say.

4. Some Case Studies

In the last few years, a number of works have addressed the problems of consciousness within the framework of cognitive science and neuroscience. This might suggest that the foregoing analysis is faulty, but in fact a close examination of the relevant work only lends the analysis further support. When we investigate just which aspects of consciousness these studies are aimed at and which aspects they end up explaining, we find that the ultimate target of explanation is always one of the easy problems. I illustrate this with two representative examples.

The first is the “neurobiological theory of consciousness” outlined by Crick and Koch (1990; see also Crick 1994). This theory centers on certain 35–75 hertz neural oscillations in the cerebral cortex; Crick and Koch hypothesize that these oscillations are the basis of consciousness. This is partly because the oscillations seem to be correlated with awareness in a number of different modalities—within the visual and olfactory systems, for example—and also because they suggest a mechanism by which the binding of information might be achieved. Binding is the process whereby separately represented pieces of information about a single entity are brought together to be used by later processing, as when information about the color and shape of a perceived object is integrated from separate visual pathways. Following others (e.g., Eckhorn et al. 1988), Crick and Koch hypothesize that binding may be achieved by the synchronized oscillations of neuronal groups representing the relevant contents. When two pieces of information are to be bound together, the relevant neural groups will oscillate with the same frequency and phase.

The details of how this binding might be achieved are still poorly understood, but suppose that they can be worked out. What might the resulting theory explain? Clearly it might explain the binding of information, and perhaps it might yield a more general account of the integration of information in the brain. Crick and Koch also suggest that these oscillations activate the mechanisms of working memory, so that there may be an account of this and perhaps other forms of memory in the distance. The
theory might eventually lead to a general account of how perceived information is bound and stored in memory for use by later processing.

Such a theory would be valuable, but it would tell us nothing about why the relevant contents are experienced. Crick and Koch suggest that these oscillations are the neural correlates of experience. This claim is arguable—does not binding also take place in the processing of unconscious information?—but even if it is accepted, the explanatory question remains: why do the oscillations give rise to experience? The only basis for an explanatory connection is the role they play in binding and storage, but the question of why binding and storage should themselves be accompanied by experience is never addressed. If we do not know why binding and storage should give rise to experience, telling a story about the oscillations cannot help us. Conversely, if we knew why binding and storage gave rise to experience, the neurophysiological details would be just the icing on the cake. Crick and Koch’s theory gains its purchase by assuming a connection between binding and experience and so can do nothing to explain that link.

I do not think that Crick and Koch are ultimately claiming to address the hard problem, although some have interpreted them that way. A published interview with Koch gives a clear statement of the limitations on the theory’s ambitions:

Well, let’s first forget about the really difficult aspects, like subjective feelings, for they may not have a scientific solution. The subjective state of play, of pain, of pleasure, of seeing blue, of smelling a rose—there seems to be a huge jump between the materialistic level, of explaining molecules and neurons, and the subjective level. Let’s focus on things that are easier to study—like visual awareness. You’re now talking to me, but you’re not looking at me, you’re looking at the cappuccino, and so you are aware of it. You can say, “It’s a cup and there’s some liquid in it.” If I give it to you, you’ll move your arm and you’ll take it—you’ll respond in a meaningful manner. That’s what I call awareness. (What Is Consciousness? Discover [November 1992], 96.)

The second example is an approach at the level of cognitive psychology. This is Bernard Baars’s global workspace theory of consciousness, presented in his book A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. According to this theory, the contents of consciousness are contained in a global workspace, a central processor used to mediate communication between a host of specialized non-conscious processors. When these specialized processors need to broadcast information to the rest of the system, they do so by sending this information
to the workspace, which acts as a kind of communal blackboard for the rest of the system, accessible to all the other processors.

Baars uses this model to address many aspects of human cognition and to explain a number of contrasts between conscious and unconscious cognitive functioning. Ultimately, however, it is a theory of cognitive accessibility that explains how it is that certain information contents are widely accessible within a system, as well as a theory of informational integration and reportability. The theory shows promise as a theory of awareness, the functional correlate of conscious experience, but an explanation of experience itself is not on offer.

One might suppose that, according to this theory, the contents of experience are precisely the contents of the workspace. However, even if this is so, nothing internal to the theory explains why the information within the global workspace is experienced. The best the theory can do is to say that the information is experienced because it is globally accessible. But now the question arises in a different form: why should global accessibility give rise to conscious experience? As always, this bridging question is unanswered.

Almost all of the work taking a cognitive or neuroscientific approach to consciousness in recent years could be subjected to a similar critique. The “neural Darwinism” model of Edelman (1989), for instance, addresses questions about perceptual awareness and the self-concept but says nothing about why there should also be experience. The “multiple drafts” model of Dennett (1991) is largely directed at explaining the reportability of certain mental contents. The “intermediate level” theory of Jackendoff (1988) provides an account of some computational processes that underlie consciousness, but Jackendoff stresses that the question of how these “project” into conscious experience remains mysterious.

Researchers using these methods are often inexplicit about their attitudes to the problem of conscious experience, although sometimes they take a clear stand. Even among those who are clear about it, attitudes differ widely. In relating this sort of work to the problem of experience, a number of different strategies are available. It would be useful if these strategic choices were more often made explicit.

The first strategy is simply to explain something else. Some researchers are explicit that the problem of experience is too difficult for now and perhaps even outside the domain of science altogether. These researchers instead choose to address one of the more tractable problems such as reportability or the concept of the self. Although I have called these problems the “easy” problems, they are among the most interesting unsolved problems in cognitive science, so this work is certainly worthwhile. The worst that can be
said of this choice is that in the context of research on consciousness it is relatively unambitious, and the work can sometimes be misinterpreted.

The second choice is to take a harder line and deny the phenomenon. (Variations on this approach are taken by Allport 1988; Dennett 1991; Wilkes 1988.) According to this line, once we have explained the functions such as accessibility and reportability, there is no further phenomenon called “experience” to explain. Some explicitly deny the phenomenon, holding, for example, that what is not externally verifiable cannot be real. Others achieve the same effect by allowing that experience exists but only if we equate “experience” with something like the capacity to discriminate and report. These approaches lead to a simpler theory but are ultimately unsatisfactory. Experience is the most central and manifest aspect of our mental lives and indeed is perhaps the key explanandum in the science of the mind. Because of this status as an explanandum, experience cannot be discarded like the vital spirit when a new theory comes along. Rather, it is the central fact that any theory of consciousness must explain. A theory that denies the phenomenon “solves” the problem by ducking the question.

In a third option, some researchers claim to be explaining experience in the full sense. These researchers (unlike those mentioned above) wish to take experience very seriously; they lay out their functional model or theory and claim that it explains the full subjective quality of experience (e.g., Flohr 1992; Humphrey 1992). The relevant step in the explanation is typically passed over quickly, however, and usually ends up looking something like magic. After some details about information processing are given, experience suddenly enters the picture, but it is left obscure how these processes should suddenly give rise to experience. Perhaps it is simply taken for granted that it does, but then we have an incomplete explanation and a version of the fifth strategy below.

A fourth, more promising approach appeals to these methods to explain the structure of experience. For example, it is arguable that an account of the discriminations made by the visual system can account for the structural relations between different color experiences, as well as for the geometric structure of the visual field (see, e.g., Clark 1992; Hardin 1992). In general, certain facts about structures found in processing will correspond to and arguably explain facts about the structure of experience. This strategy is plausible but limited. At best, it takes the existence of experience for granted and accounts for some facts about its structure, providing a sort of nonreductive explanation of the structural aspects of experience (I say more on this later). This is useful for many purposes, but it tells us nothing about why there should be experience in the first place.
A fifth and reasonable strategy is to isolate the substrate of experience. After all, almost everyone allows that experience arises in one way or another from brain processes, and it makes sense to identify the sort of process from which it arises. Crick and Koch present their work as isolating the neural correlate of consciousness, for example, and Edelman (1989) and Jackendoff (1987) make related claims. Justification of these claims requires careful theoretical analysis, especially as experience is not directly observable in experimental contexts, but when applied judiciously this strategy can shed indirect light on the problem of experience. Nevertheless, the strategy is clearly incomplete. For a satisfactory theory, we need to know more than which processes give rise to experience; we also need an account of why and how. A full theory of consciousness must build an explanatory bridge.

5. The Extra Ingredient

We have seen that there are systematic reasons why the usual methods of cognitive science and neuroscience fail to account for conscious experience. These are simply the wrong sort of methods. Nothing that they give to us can yield an explanation. To account for conscious experience, we need an extra ingredient in the explanation. This makes for a challenge to those who are serious about the hard problem of consciousness: what is your extra ingredient, and why should that account for conscious experience?

There is no shortage of extra ingredients to be had. Some propose an injection of chaos and nonlinear dynamics. Some think that the key lies in nonalgorithmic processing. Some appeal to future discoveries in neurophysiology. Some suppose that the key to the mystery will lie at the level of quantum mechanics. It is easy to see why all of these suggestions are proposed. None of the old methods work, so the solution must lie with something new. Unfortunately, these suggestions all suffer from the same old problems.

Nonalgorithmic processing, for example, is suggested by Penrose (1989, 1994) because of the role it might play in the process of conscious mathematical insight. The arguments about mathematics are controversial, but even if they succeed and an account of nonalgorithmic processing in the human brain is given, it will still only be an account of the functions involved in mathematical reasoning and the like. For a nonalgorithmic process as much as an algorithmic process, the question is left unanswered: why should this process give rise to experience? In answering this question, there is no special role for nonalgorithmic processing.

The same goes for nonlinear and chaotic dynamics. These might provide a novel account of the dynamics of cognitive functioning, quite different
from that given by standard methods in cognitive science. But from
dynamics, one only gets more dynamics. The question about experience
here is as mysterious as ever. The point is even clearer for new discoveries
in neurophysiology. These discoveries may help us make significant prog-
ress in understanding brain function, but for any neural process we isolate,
the same question will always arise. It is difficult to imagine what a propo-
nent of new neurophysiology expects to happen over and above the
explanation of further cognitive functions. It is not as if we will suddenly
discover a phenomenal glow inside a neuron!

Perhaps the most popular “extra ingredient” of all is quantum mechanics
(e.g., Hameroff 1994). The attractiveness of quantum theories of conscious-
ness may stem from a law of minimization of mystery: consciousness is
mysterious, and quantum mechanics is mysterious, so maybe the two mys-
teries have a common source. Nevertheless, quantum theories of con-
sciousness suffer from the same difficulties as neural or computational
theories. Quantum phenomena have some remarkable functional proper-
ties, such as nondeterminism and nonlocality. It is natural to speculate that
these properties may play some role in the explanation of cognitive func-
tions, such as random choice and the integration of information, and this
hypothesis cannot be ruled out a priori. When it comes to the explanation
of experience, however, quantum processes are in the same boat as any
other. The question of why these processes should give rise to experience is
entirely unanswered. 3

(One special attraction of quantum theories is the fact that, according to
some interpretations of quantum mechanics, consciousness plays an active
role in “collapsing” the quantum wave function. Such interpretations are
controversial, but in any case they offer no hope of explaining consciousness
in terms of quantum processes. Rather, these theories assume the existence
of consciousness and use it in the explanation of quantum processes. At best,
these theories tell us something about a physical role that consciousness may
play. They tell us nothing about why it arises.)

At the end of the day, the same criticism applies to any purely physical
account of consciousness. For any physical process we specify there will be
an unanswered question: why should this process give rise to experience?
Given any such process, it is conceptually coherent that it could be instan-
tiated in the absence of experience. It follows that no mere account of the
physical process will tell us why experience arises. The emergence of expe-
rience goes beyond what can be derived from physical theory.

3. *In a reply to the paper on which this chapter is based, Hameroff and Penrose (1996) explicitly
endorse the idea that experience is a fundamental element of nature.*
Purely physical explanation is well suited to the explanation of physical structures by explaining macroscopic structures in terms of detailed microstructural constituents. It also provides a satisfying explanation of the performance of functions by accounting for these functions in terms of the physical mechanisms that perform them. This is because once the internal details of the physical account are given, the structural and functional properties fall out as an automatic consequence. However, the structure and dynamics of physical processes yield only more structure and dynamics, so structures and functions are all we can expect these processes to explain. The facts about experience cannot be an automatic consequence of any physical account, as it is conceptually coherent that any given process could exist without experience. Experience may arise from the physical, but it is not explained by the physical.

The moral of all this is that you can’t explain conscious experience on the cheap. It is a remarkable fact that reductive methods—methods that explain a high-level phenomenon wholly in terms of more basic physical processes—work well in so many domains. In a sense, one can explain most biological and cognitive phenomena on the cheap, in that these phenomena are seen as automatic consequences of more fundamental processes. It would be wonderful if reductive methods could explain experience, too; I hoped for a long time that they might. Unfortunately, there are systematic reasons why these methods must fail. Reductive methods are successful in most domains because what needs explaining in those domains are structures and functions, and these are the kinds of thing that a physical account can entail. When it comes to a problem over and above the explanation of structures and functions, these methods are impotent.

This might seem reminiscent of the vitalist claim that no physical account could explain life, but the cases are disanalogous. What drove vitalist skepticism was doubt about whether physical mechanisms could perform the many remarkable functions associated with life, such as complex adaptive behavior and reproduction. The conceptual claim that explanation of functions is what is needed was implicitly accepted, but, lacking detailed knowledge of biochemical mechanisms, the vitalists doubted whether any physical process could do the job and proposed the hypothesis of the vital spirit as an alternative explanation. Once it turned out that physical processes could perform the relevant functions, vitalist doubts melted away.

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4. Garrett (2006) suggests that one vitalist, Nehemiah Grew, gave conceivability arguments closely related to those concerning consciousness. I think that on examination even Grew’s view is consistent with the idea that the vital spirit is invoked to explain the functions. It is just that, once the vital spirit is invoked in this role, one can then imagine other, counterfactual systems in which it is absent.
With experience, on the other hand, physical explanation of the functions is not in question. The key is instead the conceptual point that the explanation of functions does not suffice for the explanation of experience. This basic conceptual point is not something that further neuroscientific investigation will affect. In a similar way, experience is disanalogous to the *élan vital*. The vital spirit was presented as an explanatory posit in order to explain the relevant functions and could therefore be discarded when those functions were explained without it. Experience is not an explanatory posit but an explanandum in its own right and so is not a candidate for this sort of elimination.

It is tempting to note that all sorts of puzzling phenomena have eventually turned out to be explainable in physical terms. But these were all problems about the observable behavior of physical objects and came down to problems in the explanation of structures and functions. Because of this, these phenomena have always been the kind of thing that a physical account might explain, even if at some points there have been good reasons to suspect that no such explanation would be forthcoming. The tempting induction from these cases fails in the case of consciousness, which is not a problem about physical structures and functions. The problem of consciousness is puzzling in an entirely different way. An analysis of the problem shows us that conscious experience is just not the kind of thing that a wholly reductive account could succeed in explaining.

### 6. Nonreductive Explanation

At this point some are tempted to give up, holding that we will never have a theory of conscious experience. McGinn (1989), for example, argues that the problem is too hard for our limited minds; we are “cognitively closed” with respect to the phenomenon. Others have argued that conscious experience lies outside the domain of scientific theory altogether.

I think this pessimism is premature. This is not the place to give up; it is the place where things get interesting. When simple methods of explanation are ruled out, we need to investigate the alternatives. Given that reductive explanation fails, nonreductive explanation is the natural choice.

Although a remarkable number of phenomena have turned out to be explicable wholly in terms of entities simpler than themselves, this is not universal. In physics, it occasionally happens that an entity has to be taken as fundamental. Fundamental entities are not explained in terms of anything simpler. Instead, one takes them as basic and gives a theory of how they relate to everything else in the world. For example, in the nineteenth century it turned out that electromagnetic processes could not be explained
in terms of the wholly mechanical processes that previous physical theories appealed to, so Maxwell and others introduced electromagnetic charge and electromagnetic forces as new fundamental components of a physical theory. To explain electromagnetism, the ontology of physics had to be expanded. New basic properties and basic laws were needed to give a satisfactory account of the phenomena.

Other features that physical theory takes as fundamental include mass and space-time. No attempt is made to explain these features in terms of anything simpler. This does not rule out the possibility of a theory of mass or of space-time, however. There is an intricate theory of how these features interrelate and of the basic laws they enter into. This theory is used to explain many familiar higher-level phenomena concerning mass, space, and time.

I suggest that a theory of consciousness should take experience as fundamental. We know that a theory of consciousness requires the addition of something fundamental to our ontology, as everything in physical theory is compatible with the absence of consciousness. We might add some entirely new nonphysical feature from which experience can be derived, but it is hard to see what such a feature would be like. More likely, we will take experience itself as a fundamental feature of the world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time. If we take experience as fundamental, then we can go about the business of constructing a theory of experience.

Where there is a fundamental property, there are fundamental laws. A nonreductive theory of experience will add new principles to the basic laws of nature. These basic principles will ultimately carry the explanatory burden in a theory of consciousness. Just as we explain familiar high-level phenomena involving mass in terms of more basic principles involving mass and other entities, we might explain familiar phenomena involving experience in terms of more basic principles involving experience and other entities.

In particular, a nonreductive theory of experience will specify basic principles that tell us how experience depends on physical features of the world. These psychophysical principles will not interfere with physical laws, as it seems that physical laws already form a closed system. Rather, they will be a supplement to a physical theory. A physical theory gives a theory of physical processes, and a psychophysical theory tells us how those processes give rise to experience. We know that experience depends on physical processes, but we also know that this dependence cannot be derived from physical laws alone. The new basic principles postulated by a nonreductive theory give us the extra ingredient that we need to build an explanatory bridge.
Of course, by taking experience as fundamental, there is a sense in which this approach does not tell us why there is experience in the first place, but this is the same for any fundamental theory. Nothing in physics tells us why there is matter in the first place, but we do not count this against theories of matter. Certain features of the world need to be taken as fundamental by any scientific theory. A theory of matter can still explain all sorts of facts about matter by showing how they are consequences of the basic laws. The same goes for a theory of experience.

This position qualifies as a variety of dualism as it postulates basic properties over and above the properties invoked by physics. But it is an innocent version of dualism, entirely compatible with the scientific view of the world. Nothing in this approach contradicts anything in physical theory; we simply need to add further bridging principles to explain how experience arises from physical processes. There is nothing particularly spiritual or mystical about this theory—its overall shape is like that of a physical theory, with a few fundamental entities connected by fundamental laws. It expands the ontology slightly, to be sure, but Maxwell did the same thing. Indeed, the overall structure of this position is entirely naturalistic, allowing both that the universe ultimately comes down to a network of basic entities obeying simple laws and that there eventually may be a theory of consciousness cast in terms of such laws. If the position is to have a name, naturalistic dualism is a good choice.

If this view is right, then in some ways a theory of consciousness will have more in common with a theory in physics than a theory in biology. Biological theories involve no principles that are fundamental in this way, so biological theory has a certain complexity and messiness to it; but theories in physics, insofar as they deal with fundamental principles, aspire to simplicity and elegance. The fundamental laws of nature are part of the basic furniture of the world, and physical theories are telling us that this basic furniture is remarkably simple. If a theory of consciousness also involves fundamental principles, then we should expect the same. The principles of simplicity, elegance, and even beauty, which drive physicists’ search for a fundamental theory, will also apply to a theory of consciousness.

(Some philosophers [the type-B materialists of chapter 5] argue that even though there is a conceptual gap between physical processes and experience, there need be no metaphysical gap, so that experience might in a certain sense still be physical. I argue against this view in chapters 5–7 and chapter 10. Still, if what I have said so far is correct, this position must at least concede an explanatory gap between physical processes and experience. For example, the principles connecting the physical and the experiential will not be derivable from the laws of physics, so such principles must be taken
as *explanatorily* fundamental. So even on this sort of view, the explanatory structure of a theory of consciousness will be much as I have described.)

7. Outline of a Theory of Consciousness

It is not too soon to begin work on a theory. We are already in a position to understand certain key facts about the relationship between physical processes and experience and about the regularities that connect them. Once reductive explanation is set aside, we can lay those facts on the table so that they can play their proper role as the initial pieces in a nonreductive theory of consciousness and as constraints on the basic laws that constitute an ultimate theory.

There is an obvious problem that plagues the development of a theory of consciousness, and that is the paucity of objective data. Conscious experience is not directly observable in an experimental context, so we cannot generate data about the relationship between physical processes and experience at will. Nevertheless, we all have access to a rich source of data in our own case. Many important regularities between experience and processing can be inferred from considerations about one’s own experience. There are also good indirect sources of data from observable cases, as when one relies on the verbal report of a subject as an indication of experience. These methods have their limitations, but we have more than enough data to get a theory off the ground.

Philosophical analysis is also useful in getting value for money out of the data we have. This sort of analysis can yield a number of principles relating consciousness and cognition, thereby strongly constraining the shape of an ultimate theory. The method of thought experimentation can also yield significant rewards, as we will see. Finally, the fact that we are searching for a *fundamental* theory means that we can appeal to nonempirical constraints such as simplicity and homogeneity in developing a theory. We must seek to systematize the information we have, to extend it as far as possible by careful analysis, and then to make the inference to the simplest possible theory that explains the data while remaining a plausible candidate to be part of the fundamental furniture of the world.

Such theories will always retain an element of speculation that is not present in other scientific theories because of the impossibility of conclusive intersubjective experimental tests. Still, we can certainly construct theories that are compatible with the data that we have and evaluate them in comparison to each other. Even in the absence of intersubjective observation, there are numerous criteria available for the evaluation of such
theories: simplicity, internal coherence, coherence with theories in other domains, the ability to reproduce the properties of experience that are familiar from our own case, and even an overall fit with the dictates of common sense. Perhaps there will be significant indeterminacies remaining even when all of these constraints are applied, but we can at least develop plausible candidates. Only when candidate theories have been developed will we be able to evaluate them.

A nonreductive theory of consciousness will consist in a number of psychophysical principles, principles that connect the properties of physical processes to the properties of experience. We can think of these principles as encapsulating the way in which experience arises from the physical. Ultimately, these principles should tell us what sort of physical systems will have associated experiences, and for the systems that do, they should tell us what sort of physical properties are relevant to the emergence of experience and just what sort of experience we should expect any given physical system to yield. This is a tall order, but there is no reason we should not get started.

In what follows, I present my own candidates for the psychophysical principles that might go into a theory of consciousness. The first two of these are nonbasic principles—systematic connections between processing and experience at a relatively high level. These principles can play a significant role in developing and constraining a theory of consciousness, but they are not cast at a sufficiently fundamental level to qualify as truly basic laws. The final principle is my candidate for a basic principle, which might form the cornerstone of a fundamental theory of consciousness. This final principle is particularly speculative, but it is the kind of speculation that is required if we are ever to have a satisfying theory of consciousness. I can present these principles only briefly here; I argue for them at much greater length in The Conscious Mind.5

1. The Principle of Structural Coherence

This is a principle of coherence between the structure of consciousness and the structure of awareness. Recall that “awareness” was used earlier to refer to the various functional phenomena that are associated with consciousness. I am now using it to refer to a somewhat more specific process in the cognitive underpinnings of experience. In particular, the contents of awareness

5. *The three elements that follow are developed in chapters 6–8 of The Conscious Mind. Readers should feel free to skip or skim this material, which is not essential to the narrative of the remainder of this book.*
are to be understood as those information contents that are accessible to central systems and brought to bear in a widespread way in the control of behavior. Briefly put, we can think of awareness as direct availability for global control. To a first approximation, the contents of awareness are the contents that are directly accessible and potentially reportable, at least in a language-using system.\(^6\)

Awareness is a purely functional notion, but it is nevertheless intimately linked to conscious experience. In familiar cases, wherever we find consciousness, we find awareness. Wherever there is conscious experience, there is some corresponding information in the cognitive system that is available in the control of behavior and available for verbal report. Conversely, it seems that whenever information is available for report and for global control, there is a corresponding conscious experience. Thus, there is a direct correspondence between consciousness and awareness.

The correspondence can be taken further. It is a central fact about experience that it has a complex structure. The visual field has a complex geometry, for instance. There are also relations of similarity and difference between experiences, as well as relations in things such as relative intensity. Every subject’s experience can be at least partly characterized and decomposed in terms of these structural properties: similarity and difference relations, perceived location, relative intensity, geometric structure, and so on. It is also a central fact that, to each of these structural features, there is a corresponding feature in the information-processing structure of awareness.

Take color experiences as an example. For every distinction between color experiences, there is a corresponding distinction in processing. The different phenomenal colors that we experience form a complex three-dimensional space, varying in hue, saturation, and intensity. The properties of this space can be recovered from information-processing considerations. Examination of the visual systems shows that waveforms of light are discriminated and analyzed along three different axes, and it is this three-dimensional information that is relevant to later processing. The three-dimensional structure of phenomenal color space therefore corresponds directly to the three-dimensional structure of visual awareness. This is precisely what we would expect. After all, every experienced color distinction corresponds to some reportable information and therefore to a distinction that is represented in the structure of processing.

\(^{6}\) *Awareness is closely related to Ned Block’s “access consciousness” (1995). In effect, this principle suggests a certain coherence between the structure of phenomenal consciousness and the structure of access consciousness. This point is developed in a commentary on Block (Chalmers 1997a). The connection between availability and experience is also explored in chapter 4.*
In a more straightforward way, the geometric structure of the visual field is directly reflected in a structure that can be recovered from visual processing. Every geometric relation corresponds to something that can be reported and is therefore cognitively represented. If we were given only the story about information processing in an agent’s visual and cognitive system, we could not directly observe that agent’s visual experiences, but we could nevertheless infer those experiences’ structural properties.

In general, any information that is consciously experienced will also be cognitively represented. The fine-grained structure of the visual field will correspond to some fine-grained structure in visual processing. The same goes for experiences in other modalities and even for nonsensory experiences. Internal mental images have geometric properties that are represented in processing. Even emotions have structural properties, such as relative intensity, that correspond directly to a structural property of processing: where there is greater intensity, we find a greater effect on later processes. In general, precisely because the structural properties of experience are accessible and reportable, those properties will be directly represented in the structure of awareness.

It is this isomorphism between the structures of consciousness and awareness that constitutes the principle of structural coherence. This principle reflects the central fact that even though cognitive processes do not conceptually entail facts about conscious experience, consciousness and cognition do not float free of one another but cohere in an intimate way.

This principle has its limits. It allows us to recover structural properties of experience from information-processing properties, but not all properties of experience are structural properties. There are properties of experience, such as the intrinsic nature of a sensation of red, that cannot be fully captured in a structural description. The very intelligibility of inverted spectrum scenarios, where experiences of red and green are inverted but all structural properties remain the same, show that structural properties constrain experience without exhausting it. Nevertheless, the very fact that we feel compelled to leave structural properties unaltered when we imagine experiences inverted between functionally identical systems shows how central the principle of structural coherence is to our conception of our mental lives. It is not a logically necessary principle, as after all we can imagine all of the information processing occurring without any experience at all, but it is nevertheless a strong and familiar constraint on the psychophysical connection.

The principle of structural coherence allows for a very useful kind of indirect explanation of experience in terms of physical processes. For example, we can use facts about the neural processing of visual information
to indirectly explain the structure of color space. The facts about neural processing can entail and explain the structure of awareness; if we take the coherence principle for granted, the structure of experience will also be explained. Empirical investigation might even lead us to better understand the structure of awareness within a bat, shedding indirect light on Nagel’s vexing question of what it is like to be a bat. This principle provides a natural interpretation of much existing work on the explanation of consciousness (e.g., Clark 1992 and Hardin 1992 on colors and Akins 1993 on bats), although it is often appealed to inexplicitly. It is so familiar that it is taken for granted by almost everybody and is a central plank in the cognitive explanation of consciousness.

The coherence between consciousness and awareness also allows a natural interpretation of work in neuroscience directed at isolating the neural correlate of consciousness. This interpretation is developed further in chapter 4.

2. The Principle of Organizational Invariance

This principle states that any two systems with the same fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences. If the causal patterns of neural organization were duplicated in silicon, for example, with a silicon chip for every neuron and the same patterns of interaction, then the same experiences would arise. According to this principle, what matters for the emergence of experience is not the specific physical makeup of a system but the abstract pattern of causal interaction between its components. This principle is controversial, of course. Some (e.g., Searle 1980) have thought that consciousness is tied to a specific biology, so that a silicon isomorph of a human need not be conscious. I believe that the principle can be given significant support by the analysis of thought experiments, however.

Very briefly: suppose (for the purposes of a reductio ad absurdum) that the principle is false and that there could be two functionally isomorphic systems with different experiences. Perhaps only one of the systems is conscious, or perhaps both are conscious, but they have different experiences. For the purposes of illustration, let us say that one system is made of neurons and the other of silicon and that one experiences red where the other experiences blue. The two systems have the same organization, so we can imagine gradually transforming one into the other, perhaps replacing neurons one at a time by silicon chips with the same local function. We thus gain a spectrum of intermediate cases, each with the same organization but with slightly different physical makeup and slightly different experiences.
Along this spectrum, there must be two systems, $A$ and $B$, between which we replace less than one-tenth of the system but whose experiences differ. These two systems are physically identical, except that a small neural circuit in $A$ has been replaced by a silicon circuit in $B$.

The key step in the thought experiment is to take the relevant neural circuit in $A$ and install alongside it a causally isomorphic silicon circuit, with a switch between the two. What happens when we flip the switch? By hypothesis, the system’s conscious experiences will change—from red to blue, say. This follows from the fact that the system after the change is essentially a version of $B$, whereas before the change it is just $A$.

Given the assumptions, however, there is no way for the system to notice the changes. Its causal organization stays constant, so that all of its functional states and behavioral dispositions stay fixed. As far as the system is concerned, nothing unusual has happened. There is no room for the thought, “Hmm! Something strange just happened!” In general, the structure of any such thought must be reflected in processing, but the structure of processing remains constant here. If there were to be such a thought, it must float entirely free of the system and would be utterly impotent to affect later processing. (If it affected later processing, the systems would be functionally distinct, contrary to the hypothesis). We might even flip the switch a number of times, so that experiences of red and blue dance back and forth before the system’s “inner eye.” According to the hypothesis, the system can never notice these “dancing qualia.”

This I take to be a reductio of the original assumption.7 It is a central fact about experience, very familiar from our own case, that whenever experiences change significantly and we are paying attention, we can notice the change; if this were not the case, we would be led to the skeptical possibility that our experiences are dancing before our eyes all the time. This hypothesis has the same status as the possibility that the world was created five minutes ago: perhaps it is logically coherent, but it is not plausible. Given the extremely plausible assumption that changes in experience correspond to changes in processing, we are led to the conclusion that the original hypothesis is impossible and that any two functionally isomorphic

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7. *I still find this hypothesis very odd, but I am now inclined to think that it is something less than a reductio. Work on change blindness has gotten us used to the idea that large changes in consciousness can go unnoticed. Admittedly, these changes are outside attention, and unnoticed changes in the contents of attention would be much stranger, but it is perhaps not so strange as to be ruled out in all circumstances. Russellian monism (see chapter 5) also provides a natural model in which such changes could occur. In *The Conscious Mind* I suggested that this “dancing qualia” argument was somewhat stronger than the “fading qualia” argument given there; I would now reverse that judgment.*
systems must have the same sort of experiences. To put it in technical terms, the philosophical hypotheses of “absent qualia” and “inverted qualia,” while logically possible, are empirically and nomologically impossible.

(Some may worry that a silicon isomorph of a neural system might be impossible for technical reasons. That question is open. The invariance principle says only that if an isomorph is possible, then it will have the same sort of conscious experience.)

There is more to be said here, but this gives the basic flavor. Once again, this thought experiment draws on familiar facts about the coherence between consciousness and cognitive processing to yield a strong conclusion about the relation between physical structure and experience. If the argument goes through, we know that the only physical properties directly relevant to the emergence of experience are organizational properties. This acts as a further strong constraint on a theory of consciousness.

3. The Double-Aspect Theory of Information

The two preceding principles are nonbasic principles. They involve high-level notions such as “awareness” and “organization” and therefore lie at the wrong level to constitute the fundamental laws in a theory of consciousness. Nevertheless, they act as strong constraints. What is further needed are basic principles that fit these constraints and that might ultimately explain them.

The basic principle that I suggest centrally involves the notion of information. I understand information in more or less the sense of Shannon (1948). Where there is information, there are information states embedded in an information space. An information space has a basic structure of difference relations between its elements, characterizing the ways in which different elements in a space are similar or different, possibly in complex ways. An information space is an abstract object, but following Shannon we can see information as physically embodied when there is a space of distinct physical states, the differences between which can be transmitted down some causal pathway. The transmittable states can be seen as themselves constituting an information space. To borrow a phrase from Bateson (1972), physical information is a difference that makes a difference.

The double-aspect principle stems from the observation that there is a direct isomorphism between certain physically embodied information spaces and certain phenomenal (or experiential) information spaces. From the same sort of observations that went into the principle of structural
coherence, we can note that the differences between phenomenal states have a structure that corresponds directly to the differences embedded in physical processes; in particular, to those differences that make a difference down certain causal pathways implicated in global availability and control. That is, we can find the same abstract information space embedded in physical processing and in conscious experience.

This leads to a natural hypothesis: that information (or at least some information) has two basic aspects, a physical aspect and a phenomenal aspect. This has the status of a basic principle that might underlie and explain the emergence of experience from the physical. Experience arises by virtue of its status as one aspect of information, when the other aspect is found embodied in physical processing.

This principle is lent support by a number of considerations, which I can outline only briefly here. First, consideration of the sort of physical changes that correspond to changes in conscious experience suggests that such changes are always relevant by virtue of their role in constituting informational changes—differences within an abstract space of states that are divided up precisely according to their causal differences along certain pathways. Second, if the principle of organizational invariance is to hold, then we need to find some fundamental organizational property for experience to be linked to, and information is an organizational property par excellence. Third, this principle offers some hope of explaining the principle of structural coherence in terms of the structure present within information spaces. Fourth, analysis of the cognitive explanation of our judgments and claims about conscious experience—judgments that are functionally explainable but nevertheless deeply tied to experience itself—suggests that explanation centrally involves the information states embedded in cognitive processing. It follows that a theory based on information allows a deep coherence between the explanation of experience and the explanation of our judgments and claims about it.

Wheeler (1990) has suggested that information is fundamental to the physics of the universe. According to this “it from bit” doctrine, the laws of physics can be cast in terms of information, postulating different states that give rise to different effects without actually saying what those states are. It is only their position in an information space that counts. If so, then information is a natural candidate to also play a role in a fundamental theory of consciousness. We are led to a conception of the world in which information is truly fundamental and in which it has two basic aspects, one that corresponds to the physical and one that corresponds to the phenomenal features of the world.
Of course, the double-aspect principle is extremely speculative and also underdetermined, leaving a number of key questions unanswered. An obvious question is whether all information has a phenomenal aspect. One possibility is that we need a further constraint on the fundamental theory, indicating just what sort of information has a phenomenal aspect. The other possibility is that there is no such constraint. If not, then experience is much more widespread than we might have believed, as information is everywhere. This is counterintuitive at first, but on reflection the position gains a certain plausibility and elegance. Where there is simple information processing, there is simple experience, and where there is complex information processing, there is complex experience. A mouse has a simpler information-processing structure than a human and has correspondingly simpler experience; might a thermostat, a maximally simple information-processing structure, have maximally simple experience? Indeed, if experience is truly a fundamental property, it would be surprising for it to arise only every now and then; most fundamental properties are more evenly spread. In any case, this is very much an open question, but I think that the position is not as implausible as it is often thought to be.

Once a fundamental link between information and experience is on the table, the door is opened to some grander metaphysical speculation concerning the nature of the world. For example, it is often noted that physics characterizes its basic entities only extrinsically, in terms of their relations to other entities, which are themselves characterized extrinsically, and so on. The intrinsic nature of physical entities is left aside. Some argue that no such intrinsic properties exist, but then one is left with a world that is pure causal flux (a pure flow of information) with no properties for the causation to relate. If one allows that intrinsic properties exist, a natural speculation, given the preceding, is that the intrinsic properties of the physical—the properties that causation ultimately relates—are themselves phenomenal properties.\(^8\) We might say that phenomenal properties are the internal aspect of information. This could answer a concern about the causal relevance of experience—a natural worry, given a picture in which the physical domain is causally closed and in which experience is supplementary to the physical. The informational view allows us to understand how experience might have a subtle kind of causal relevance in virtue of its status as the intrinsic nature of the physical. This metaphysical speculation is probably best ignored for the purposes of developing a scientific theory, but in addressing some philosophical issues it is quite suggestive.

\(^8\) See the discussion of type-F monism in chapter 5 and of Russellian monism in chapter 6 for much more on this theme.
8. Conclusion

The theory I have presented is speculative, but it is a candidate theory. I suspect that the principles of structural coherence and organizational invariance will be planks in any satisfactory theory of consciousness; the status of the double-aspect theory of information is less certain. Indeed, right now it is more of an idea than a theory. To have any hope of eventual explanatory success, it will have to be specified more fully and fleshed out into a more powerful form. Still, reflection on just what is plausible and implausible about it and on where it works and where it fails can only lead to a better theory.

Most existing theories of consciousness either deny the phenomenon, explain something else, or elevate the problem to an eternal mystery. I hope to have shown that it is possible to make progress on the problem even while taking it seriously. To make further progress we will need further investigation, more refined theories, and more careful analysis. The hard problem is a hard problem, but there is no reason to believe that it will remain permanently unsolved.9

Afterword: From “Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness”

There are two quite different ways in which a materialist might respond to the challenge in this chapter. One sort of response denies that on reflection there is a “hard problem” distinct from the “easy” problems or at least holds that solving the easy problems (perhaps along with some philosophical reflection) suffices to solve the hard problem. Another accepts that there is a distinctive phenomenon that generates a distinctive hard problem that goes beyond the easy problems but argues that it can be accommodated within a materialist framework all the same. To a first approximation, the first sort of view corresponds to what I call type-A materialism in

chapter 5, while the second sort corresponds to type-B and type-C materialism. The second sort of response is much more popular than the first, and I discuss it at some length in other chapters here (especially chapters 6 and 10). So in this afterword I take the opportunity to address the first sort of response, as put forward in articles responding to this chapter by Paul Churchland (1996) and Daniel Dennett (1996).

The type-A materialist, more precisely, denies that there is any phenomenon that needs explaining, over and above accounting for the various functions: once we have explained how the functions are performed, we have thereby explained everything. Sometimes type-A materialism is expressed by denying that consciousness exists; more often, it is expressed by claiming that consciousness may exist but only if the term “consciousness” is defined as something like “reportability” or some other functional capacity. Either way, it is asserted that there is no interesting fact about the mind in the vicinity that is conceptually distinct from the functional facts and that needs to be accommodated in our theories. Once we have explained how the functions are performed, that is that.

This is an extremely counterintuitive position. At first glance, it seems to simply deny a manifest fact about us. But it deserves to be taken seriously: After all, counterintuitive theories are not unknown in science and philosophy. On the other hand, to establish a counterintuitive position, strong arguments are needed. And to establish a position as counterintuitive as this, one might think that extraordinarily strong arguments are needed. So what arguments do its proponents provide?

A common strategy for a type-A materialist is to deflate the hard problem by using analogies to other domains, where talk of such a problem would be misguided. Thus, Dennett imagines a vitalist arguing about the hard problem of “life” or a neuroscientist arguing about the hard problem of “perception.” Similarly, Paul Churchland imagines a nineteenth-century philosopher worrying about the hard problem of “light.” In these cases, we are to suppose, someone might once have thought that more needed explaining than structure and function, but in each case, science has proved them wrong. So perhaps the argument about consciousness is no better.

This sort of argument cannot bear much weight, however. Pointing out that analogous arguments do not work in other domains is no news. The whole point of antireductionist arguments about consciousness is that there is a disanalogy between the problem of consciousness and problems in other domains. As for the claim that analogous arguments in such domains might once have been plausible, this strikes me as something of a convenient myth. In the other domains, it is more or less obvious that structure and function are what need explaining, at least once any
experiential aspects are left aside, and one would be hard pressed to find a substantial body of people who ever argued otherwise.

When it comes to the problem of life, for example, it is just obvious that what needs explaining is structure and function. How does a living system self-organize? How does it adapt to its environment? How does it reproduce? Even the vitalists recognized this central point. Their driving question was always, “How could a mere physical system perform these complex functions?”, not “Why are these functions accompanied by life?”. It is no accident that Dennett’s version of a vitalist is “imaginary.” There is no distinct hard problem of life, and there never was one, even for vitalists.

In general, when faced with the challenge “explain X,” we need to ask: what are the phenomena in the vicinity of X that need explaining, and how might we explain them? In the case of life, what cries out for explanation are phenomena such as reproduction, adaptation, metabolism, and self-sustenance: all complex functions. There is not even a plausible candidate for a further sort of property of life that needs explaining (leaving aside consciousness itself), and indeed there never was. In the case of consciousness, on the other hand, the manifest phenomena that need explaining are things such as discrimination, reportability, integration (the functions), and experience, so this analogy does not even get off the ground.

If someone were to claim that something has been left out by reductive explanations of light (Paul Churchland’s example) or of heat (an example used by Patricia Churchland 1997), what something might they be referring to? The only phenomenon for which the suggestion would be even remotely plausible is our subjective experience of light and hotness. The molecular theory of heat does not explain the sensation of heat, and the electromagnetic theory of light does not explain what it is like to see, and understandably so. The physicists explaining heat and light have quite reasonably deferred the explanation of their experiential manifestations until the time when we have a reasonable theory of consciousness. One need not explain everything at once. With consciousness itself, however, subjective experience is precisely what is at issue, so we cannot defer the question in the same way. So once again, the analogy is no help to a reductionist.

Paul Churchland suggests that parallel antireductionist arguments could have been constructed for the phenomenon of “luminescence” and might have been found plausible at the time. I have my doubts about that plausibility, but in any case it is striking that his arguments about luminescence all depend on intuitions about the conscious experience of light. His hypothetical advocate of a “hard problem” about light appeals to light’s “visibility” and the “visual point of view”; his advocate of a “knowledge argument” about light appeals to blind Mary, who has never had the experience of
seeing; and the advocate of a “zombie” argument appeals to the conceivability of a universe physically just like ours but in which everything is dark. That the first two arguments trade on intuitions about experience is obvious, and even for the third, it is clear on a moment’s reflection that the only way such a universe might make sense is as a universe in which the same electromagnetic transmission goes on but in which no one has the experience of seeing.

Churchland might insist that by “luminescence” he means something quite independent of experience, which physical accounts still do not explain, but then the obvious reply is that there is no good reason to believe in luminescence in the first place. Light’s structural, functional, and experiential manifestations exhaust the phenomena that cry out for explanation and the phenomena in which we have any reason to believe. By contrast, conscious experience presents itself as a phenomenon to be explained and cannot be eliminated in the same way.

So, analogies do not help. To have any chance of making the case, a type-A materialist needs to argue that for consciousness, as for life, the functions are all that need explaining. Perhaps some strong, subtle, and substantive argument can be given, establishing that once we have explained the functions, we have automatically explained everything. If a sound argument could be given for this surprising conclusion, it would provide as valid a resolution of the hard problem as any.

Is there any compelling, non-question-begging argument for this conclusion? The key word, of course, is “non-question-begging.” Often a proponent will simply assert that functions are all that need explaining or will argue in a way that subtly assumes this position at some point, but that is clearly unsatisfactory. Prima facie, there is very good reason to believe that the phenomena that a theory of consciousness must account for include not just discrimination, integration, report, and other such functions but also experience, and prima facie there is good reason to believe that the question of explaining experience is distinct from the questions about explaining the various functions. Such prima facie intuitions can be overturned, but to do so requires very solid and substantial argument. Otherwise, the problem is being “resolved” simply by placing one’s head in the sand.

Such arguments are not easy to find. Dennett is the one of the few philosophers who has attempted to give them, and his arguments are typically not extensive. In his response to this chapter, he spends about a paragraph making the case. I take it that this paragraph bears the weight of his piece, once the trimmings are stripped away. So it is this paragraph that we should examine.

Dennett’s argument here, interestingly enough, is an appeal to phenomenology. He examines his own phenomenology and tells us that he finds
nothing other than functions that need explaining. The manifest phenomena that need explaining are his reactions and his abilities; nothing else even presents itself as needing to be explained.

This is daringly close to a simple denial—one is tempted to agree that it might be a good account of Dennett’s phenomenology—and it raises immediate questions. For a start, it is far from obvious that even all of the items on Dennett’s list—“feelings of foreboding,” “fantasies,” “delight and dismay”—are purely functional matters. To assert without argument that all that needs to be explained about such things are the associated functions seems to beg the crucial question at issue. And if we leave these controversial cases aside, Dennett’s list seems to be a systematically incomplete list of what needs to be explained in explaining consciousness. One’s “ability to be moved to tears” and “blithe disregard of perceptual details” are striking phenomena, but they are far from the most obvious phenomena that I (at least) find when I introspect. Much more obvious are the experience of emotion and the phenomenal visual field themselves, and nothing Dennett says gives us reason to believe that these do not need to be explained or that explaining the associated functions will explain them.

What might be going on here? Perhaps the key lies in what has elsewhere been described as the foundation of Dennett’s philosophy: “third-person absolutism.” If one takes the third-person perspective on oneself—viewing oneself from the outside, so to speak—these reactions and abilities are no doubt the main focus of what one sees. But the hard problem is about explaining the view from the first-person perspective. So to shift perspectives like this—even to shift to a third-person perspective on one’s first-person perspective, which is one of Dennett’s favorite moves—is again to assume that what needs explaining are functional matters such as reactions and reports and so is again to argue in a circle.

Dennett suggests “subtract the functions and nothing is left.” Again, I can see no reason to accept this, but in any case the argument seems to have the wrong form. An analogy suggested by Gregg Rosenberg (in conversation) is useful here. Color has properties of hue, saturation, and brightness. It is plausible that if one “subtracts” hue from a color, nothing phenomenologically significant is left, but this certainly does not imply that color is nothing but hue. So even if Dennett could argue that function were somehow required for experience (in the same way that hue is required for color), this would fall a long way short of showing that function is all that has to be explained.

A slight flavor of noncircular argument is hinted at by Dennett’s suggestion: “I wouldn’t know what I was thinking about if I couldn’t identify them
by their functional differentia.” This tantalizing sentence suggests various interpretations, but all of the reconstructions that I can find fall short of making the case. If the idea is that functional role is essential to the (subpersonal) process of identification, this falls short of establishing that functioning is essential to the experiences themselves, let alone that functioning is all there is to the experiences. If the idea is rather that function is all we have access to at the personal level, this seems false and seems to beg the question against the intuitive view that we have knowledge of intrinsic features of experience. But if Dennett can elaborate this into a substantial argument, that would be a very useful service.

In his paper Dennett challenges me to provide “independent” evidence (presumably behavioral or functional evidence) for the “postulation” of experience. But this is to miss the point. Conscious experience is not “postulated” to explain other phenomena in turn; rather, it is a phenomenon to be explained in its own right. And if it turns out that it cannot be explained in terms of more basic entities, then it must be taken as irreducible, just as happens with categories such as space and time. Again, Dennett’s “challenge” presupposes that the only explananda that count are functions.

(Tangentially, I would be interested to see Dennett’s version of the “independent” evidence that leads physicists to “introduce” the fundamental categories of space and time. It seems to me that the relevant evidence is spatiotemporal through and through, just as the evidence for experience is experiential through and through.)

Dennett might respond that I, equally, do not give arguments for the position that something more than functions needs to be explained. There would be some justice here: while I do argue at length for my conclusions, all of these arguments take the existence of consciousness for granted, where the relevant concept of consciousness is explicitly distinguished from functional concepts such as discrimination, integration, reaction, and report. Dennett presumably disputes this starting point: he thinks that the only sense in which people are conscious is a sense in which consciousness is defined as reportability, as a reactive disposition, or as some other functional concept.

But let us be clear on the dialectic. It is prima facie obvious to most people that there is a further phenomenon here. In informal surveys, the large majority of respondents (even at Tufts!) indicate that they think something more than functions needs explaining. Dennett himself—faced with the results of such a survey, perhaps intending to deflate it—has accepted that there is at least a prima facie case that something more than functions needs to be explained, and he has often stated how “radical” and “counterintuitive” his position is. So it is clear that the default assumption is that
there is a further problem of explanation; to establish otherwise requires significant and substantial argument.

I would welcome such arguments in the ongoing attempt to clarify the lay of the land. The challenge for those such as Dennett is to make the nature of these arguments truly clear. I do not think it a worthless project—the hard problem is so hard that we should welcome all attempts at a resolution—but it is clear that anyone trying to make such an argument is facing an uphill battle.